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Consequences of Nuclear War 
for Civilians
Abstract
Much of the debate over nuclear weapons poli­
cy continues to revolve around discussions of the 
usefulness of nuclear attacks on military tar­
gets. Much less attention, however, is devoted to 
either the number or the importance of the ci­
vilian casualties that such attacks would cause.
The short-term civilian casualties that would 
result from the use of nuclear weapons at three 
different levels of "limited nuclear war" are con­
sidered. These levels range from the employment 
of neutron bombs during an otherwise "convention­
al" battle in the Germanies to a nuclear attack 
against the strategic forces of the U.S. In ad­
dition, the consequences of all-out attacks by the 
superpowers on each other's cities are briefly 
discussed. It is found that nuclear planners and 
strategists have almost always grossly underesti­
mated the human costs of the use of nuclear 
weapons.
Introduction
It is widely believed that, if one of the 
superpowers resorted to the use of nuclear wea­
pons, the subsequent exchanges might well escalate 
to all-out nuclear war. It is also widely be­
lieved that neither superpower can hope, by 
attacking the nuclear forces of the other, to el­
iminate the possibility of its own destruction. 
These beliefs are major deterrents to the use of 
nuclear weapons.
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The U.S. defense posture vis a vis the Soviet 
Union in Europe, the Persian Gulf, and elsewhere 
is, however, based on another premise: that the
U.S. is willing, if necessary, to initiate the use 
of nuclear weapons to stop the Soviet Union from 
crossing certain imaginary lines that have been 
drawn around areas the U.S. considers to be of 
"vital interest."
In order for this threat of first nuclear use 
to be credible to the Soviets, however, it is 
first necessary to convince ourselves that the 
benefits would outweigh the costs. This may ex­
plain why there is little discussion in the of­
ficial literature of the considerations that might 
discourage the use of nuclear weapons.
The principal subject of this paper is one of 
these neglected areas: the unintended immediate
casualties among civilians that would result from 
the use of nuclear weapons on military targets. 
The longer-term effects are discussed in subse­
quent chapters. In these estimates we take ac­
count of the likely effects of short-term radi­
ation fallout of the type described by Upton in 
chapter 5 but we do not consider the long-term 
fallout effects on people or on ecosystems as out­
lined in chapters 5 and 6. The casualty figures 
discussed in this chapter are therefore on the 
very low side, and provide a minimum to which 
should be added estimates of the broader environ­
mental effects. We discuss here the civilian fa­
talities that would result from the use of nuclear 
weapons for several cases that we and others have 
analyzed in some depth:
• Battlefield use in the Germanies (East and
West) against conventional forces such as 
tanks;
• Use on the "theater" level— also in the
Germanies--against medium- and intermedi­
ate-range nuclear weapon systems and nucle­
ar warhead storage depots;
• Use against missile silos, bomber bases,
and nuclear naval support facilities in the 
U .S.; and
• Use against the cities of the superpowers.
Battlefield Use of Nuclear Weapons
Any major conflict on the conventional level 
between the superpowers would bring with it the
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danger that the losing side would resort to 
battlefield nuclear weapons. In Europe, this 
threat of "escalation" is implicit in the deploy­
ment of thousands of short-range nuclear warheads 
and delivery systems by the NATO and WTO (Warsaw 
Treaty Organization) forces.
According to the U.S. Army Field Manual (U.S. 
Army, 1982), U.S. battlefield nuclear systems are 
designed for use against
• Enemy nuclear delivery systems.
• Key command and control elements.
• Support forces in the rear of committed
elements.
• Follow-on or deep-echeloned forces; and
• Reserves.
Battlefield nuclear systems range from atomic 
demolition mines, with explosive yields on the 
order of ten tons (0.01 kiloton) TNT equivalent, 
to bombs carried by tactical fighter-bombers, with 
yields of over one million tons (one megaton) TNT 
equivalent. Between these extremes in both yield 
and range are nuclear artillery shells and short- 
range surface-to-surface ballistic missiles 
(Cochran et al., 1983).
The Field Manual also describes how NATO use 
of these weapons would be authorized in "pack­
ages :"
A package is a group of nuclear weapons of 
specific yields for use in a specific area 
and within a limited time to support a speci­
fic tactical goal. Each package must contain 
nuclear weapons sufficient to alter the tact­
ical situation decisively and to accomplish 
the mission.
The 1976 edition of the Field Manual gives as an 
example a package consisting of 2 atomic demo­
lition mines (ADM), 30 rounds of nuclear artil­
lery, 10 surface-to-surface missiles, and 5 air- 
delivered bombs (see Fig. 2-1).
Efforts would, of course, be made in planning 
and targeting such a set of nuclear warheads to 
minimize "collateral damage" to populated areas. 
This would be hard to do. The most-discussed 
hypothetical nuclear battlefield in the world in 
Europe and the most heavily nuclearized region in 
Europe is the two Germanies. The average popu-
21
E M P LO Y M E N T
Fig. 2-1. A hypothetical "package" of battlefield nuclear weapons 
being delivered in front of and on the spearhead and follow-up 
formations of an attacking ground force. It includes 2 atomic 
demolition mines (ADM), 30 nuclear projectiles fired by artil­
lery ("cannon"), 10 warheads delivered by short-range battle­
field missiles ("Msl"), and 5 nuclear bombs delivered by air­
craft (U.S. Army, 1976).
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Fig. 2-2. Lethal Areas Around Ground Zero for a Neutron Bomb Exploded at an Alti­
tude of 450 Meters. The innermost circle shows the area of desired military 
effect: rapid onset of debilitating radiation illness. The slightly larger
circle shows the area of serious blast damage to civilian structures. And 
the largest circle shows the area in which unshielded persons would receive 
large enough radiation doses to cause death from radiation illness within two 
months (von Hippel, 1983).
lation density of this area is 200 persons per 
square kilometer, with one populated place per 
four square kilometers (Arkin et al., 1982). Ad­
ditional targeting difficulties would flow from 
the fact that roads naturally pass through these 
cities, towns, and villages and therefore so would 
many of the military units that would be the tar­
gets of battlefield nuclear weapons. In many 
cases, the roads between towns would be crowded 
with refugees. Finally, attacking military forces 
might use urban and refugee "hugging" tactics so 
as to discourage the use of battlefield nuclear 
weapons against themselves (Bracken, 1979).
Under these circumstances, and assuming 
short-term fallout effects of the magnitude speci­
fied in chapter 5, more than a million civilian 
deaths could result from the use of battlefield 
nuclear weapons at a militarily significant 
level. Even a one-kiloton neutron bomb would ex­
pose an area of about 5 square kilometers, popu­
lated in the Germanies by an average of 1000 
people, to radiation doses in the lethal range 
(see Fig. 2-2), and it would require more than one 
thousand such explosions to immobilize a signifi­
cant fraction of the 20,000 tanks that might be 
involved in a full-scale battle between NATO and 
WTO forces in the Germanies (Arkin et al., 1982).
Unfortunately, it is not clear that nuclear 
planners understand the horrendous carnage that 
would result from the use of even the lowest-yield 
nuclear warheads on the battlefield. According to 
Paul Bracken (1979), much of U.S. nuclear planning 
is based on the results of computerized war games 
that predict thousands, not millions, of civilian 
fatalities from the use of nuclear weapons on the 
battlefield. He reports that these very low fa­
tality numbers are obtained because the computers 
are programmed to assume that there are no refu­
gees on the roads and to
treat Soviet forces as automata who cross in­
to West Germany and advance directly into 
[unpopulated] NATO nuclear killing zones. 
Here they are detected and destroyed by the 
lowest yield nuclear weapon capable of doing 
the job. Command and control difficulties, 
confusion, false targeting and other problems 
are simply assumed away . . . What actually 
prevents either side from getting too close
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to the 4000 towns and cities in Germany is a 
collection of Fortran statements (Bracken, 
1979).
Preemptive Use of Nuclear Weapons in Europe
Clearly, the consequences for civilian popu­
lations of even the use of relatively low-yield 
nuclear weapons on the battlefield could be cata­
strophic. And, it is quite possible that, in a 
crisis so severe that it resulted in the crossing 
of the nuclear threshold, the use of nuclear wea­
pons would spread from the front lines. Indeed, 
both superpowers have deployed in Europe medium- 
and intermediate-range (up to about 5000 km for 
the Soviet SS-20 missile) nuclear weapon systems 
to back up their short-range battlefield nuclear 
systems. There are approximately 2000 warheads on 
land- and submarine-based missiles with ranges 
greater than 150 km in and around Europe plus 
nuclear bombs for an estimated 2500 nuclear- 
capable fighter-bombers and medium-range bombers. 
These warheads range in yield from about one kilo- 
ton to more than one megaton (Arkin et al., 1982).
These "theater" nuclear weapon systems are 
intended to destroy a whole range of targets:
IRBM/MRBM [Intermediate and Medium Range 
Ballistic Missile] sites; naval bases; 
nuclear and chemical storage sites; airbases; 
command, control, and communication centers; 
headquarters complexes; surface-to-air 
missile sites; munitions and petroleum 
storage areas and transfer facilities; ground 
forces installations; choke points; troop 
concentrations; and bridges (U.S. House 
Comm, on For. Affairs and Sen. For. Rel. 
Comm., 1980).
This list corresponds to over one thousand poten­
tial targets in the Germanies alone (Arkin et al., 
1982).
There are, to our knowledge, no official es­
timates of the civilian casualties that might re­
sult from the use of a significant fraction of 
these theater nuclear weapons on their intended 
targets. In order to gauge the possible conse­
quences, therefore, an independent calculation was 
recently undertaken. The scenario examined in­
volved an attack limited to the nuclear targets in 
the above list located in the Germanies (Arkin et
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al., 1982). This target set comprised a total of 
171 surface-to-surface missile sites, military air 
bases and nuclear weapons storage depots (see 
Fig. 2-3). It would be natural to give these tar­
gets the highest priority since they pose the 
greatest destructive threat to the opposing forces 
in this region. It was assumed that each would be 
targeted by one or two 200-kiloton warheads.
The resulting civilian casualties in the two 
Germanies were estimated to range from 1.5-11 mil­
lion deaths (7-25 million total casualties). The 
low figures were obtained by assuming that one 
200-kiloton warhead exploded at an altitude of 2 
kilometers over each target— too high to cause 
local fallout. The high figures were obtained by 
assuming attacks with two warheads--one air-burst 
and one ground-burst— on each target. This latter 
type of attack was assumed for "time urgent" tar­
gets such as nuclear air bases by NATO planners in 
a recent war-game (Campbell, 1981).
Thus, even the very limited use of theater 
nuclear weapons assumed in this scenario against 
purely military targets would leave a large frac­
tion of the 76 million people living in the two 
Germanies dead and injured. These casualty esti­
mates do not include the deaths that would result 
from the radioactive fallout carried by the wind 
into neighboring countries. (Fig. 2-4 shows the 
projected fallout pattern from the groundbursts 
using "typical June winds.") Nor do they include 
longer-term deaths, such as those from radiation- 
induced cancers, exposure, starvation, and epi­
demics .
Once again, the attacks envisioned in this 
scenario are very restrained— both in terms of the 
types of targets attacked and the small fraction 
of the available nuclear arsenal used. This re­
straint does not seem very plausible. All of the 
land-based nuclear delivery systems in Europe are 
vulnerable to nuclear attack, and the initiation 
of nuclear warfare would result in enormous pres­
sures being put on nuclear decision-makers to "use 
them or lose them."
Preemptive Strikes at the Intercontinental Level
The leaders of both superpowers have stated 
that the use of theater nuclear weapons in a re­
gional war would probably result in further esca-
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TARGETS OF PREEMPTIVE ATTACKS
(D  NUCLEAR STORAGE SITES
>1
Pig. 2-3. Nuclear Targets in the Germanies. The 
area of each circle is 180 square kilometers 
--approximately equal to the area of destruc­
tion below a 200 kiloton warhead exploded at 
an altitude of 2 kilometers (Arkin et al., 1982).
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lation to the use of long-range "strategic" nucle­
ar weapons against targets located in the U.S. and 
the Soviet Union. Indeed, a principal argument 
for the deployment of U.S. cruise and Pershing II 
missiles in Western Europe is that, since these 
weapons can reach deep into the Soviet Union, they 
will make it even more difficult to limit nuclear 
war to Central Europe.
At the intercontinental level, the highest 
priority targets for each side would once again be 
the nuclear forces of the other side. In fact, 
much of the history of the nuclear arms race is 
that of efforts by each side to make the other 
side's nuclear weapon-systems more vulnerable to 
attack while trying to decrease the vulnerability 
of its own. The MX missile, for example, was ori­
ginally intended both to increase the U.S. threat 
to Soviet ICBMs and to be less vulnerable than ex­
isting U.S. Minuteman missiles to attack by those 
same Soviet ICBMs.
As we have seen, almost no official infor­
mation has been made available to the public about 
the civilian fatalites that could result from the 
use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield or 
theater levels. More information has been made 
available in the case of intercontinental attacks 
against strategic nuclear forces, however, because 
of a controversy triggered in 1974 when the Secre­
tary of Defense, James Schlesinger, argued that 
the U.S. should be better prepared to respond "to 
a limited attack on military targets that caused 
relatively few civilian casualties" (Schlesinger, 
1974).
The idea that a nuclear attack on the U.S. 
would not inevitably kill vast numbers of people 
was a novel one. Schlesinger was therefore 
questioned in March, 1974, at a Senate Foreign 
Relations subcommittee hearing, as to what he 
meant by "relatively few civilian casualties." He 
replied, "I am talking here about casualties of 
15,000, 20,000, 25,000 . . ." (U.S. Sen. For. 
Rel. Comm., 1974a). The Senators were not satis­
fied with this answer, however. Schlesinger was 
asked to return and give them a briefing "on the 
consequences of the wide ranges of possible anti­
military attacks against the U.S." (U.S. Sen. 
For. Rel. Comm., 1974b).
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FALLOUT PATTERN FROM 
PREEMPTIVE NUCLEAR 
ATTACKS WITH 200 kT. 
GROUNDBURSTS ON 171 
MILITARY TARGETS IN 
THE GERMANIES
2 0 0 -6 0 0  RADS 
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KILOMETERS100 0 100I----- 1......1
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Fig. 2-4. Fallout from 200-kiloton ground-bursts on 
the targets shown in Fig. 2-3, given "typical 
June winds". The black areas are those where 
the radiation levels would be lethal to unshel­
tered persons. The shaded areas are those in 
which the radiation levels would be high enough 
to cause severe radiation illness (Arkin etal., 1982) .
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When Secretary Schlesinger returned in 
September, he reported estimates that the civilian 
casualties resulting from an all-out Soviet 
"counterforce attacks" against U.S. ICBM silos, 
strategic bomber bases, and nuclear navy bases 
might total about one million (U.S. Sen. For. 
Rel. Comm., 1974b). The Senators were still not 
satisfied, however, and asked the Congressional 
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) to set up an 
outside review of the assumptions that had been 
made in the DOD calculations. Ultimately, as a 
result of the OTA group's criticisms, the DOD ana­
lysts revised many of their assumptions with the 
result that their fatality estimates rose into the 
range of 3-16 million (U.S. Sen. For. Rel. Comm., 
1975) .
Below, we consider separately the DOD's fa­
tality estimates for attacks against the three 
sets of nuclear targets which were considered: 
ICBM silos, strategic bomber bases, and nuclear 
naval bases. We will discuss both the extent to 
which they were revised as a result of the expert 
panel1s criticisms and the extent to which we find 
even the revised estimates to be an inadequate re­
presentation of the potential consequences of 
these nuclear attacks.
Attacks on ICBM Fields
The bulk of the warheads involved in an at­
tack against U.S. strategic nuclear forces would 
be thrown against the ICBM force— currently 1000 
Minuteman missiles and approximately 50 Titan II 
missiles--and their associated launch-control 
facilities. These missiles and launch-control 
facilities are distributed across the Great Plains 
and Southwestern U.S. in six major and three minor 
missile "fields" (see Fig. 2-5).
Since these missile fields are generally lo­
cated in relatively sparsely populated areas, the 
blast and heat of Soviet warheads exploding over 
them would cause relatively few civilian casual­
ties. The missile silos and launch control cen­
ters are so hardened, however, that in order to 
subject one to sufficient overpressure to destroy 
it, a nuclear warhead would have to be exploded at 
such a low altitude that the fireball would touch 
the ground. As a result, such dirt and debris 
would be sucked up into the fireball, be contami­
nated with fission products, and subsequently fall
30
FALLOUT FROM AN ATTACK ON U.S. MISSILE SILOS
FATALITIES
C\W\~1 GREATER THAN 50%,IND00RS ABOVE GROUND 
iV.'.YJ GREATER THAN SO%,OUTDOORS
■ MINUTE MAN FELDS 
□  TITAN FELDS
ASSUMPTIONS
• 2 -O N E  MEGATON WARHEADS 
ON EACH SILO
• S O %  FISSION YIELD
• SURFACE BURSTS
• TYPICAL MARCH WINDS
Fig. 2-5. Predicted fallout pattern, given "typical 
March winds" from 2 one-megaton warheads sur­
face-burst on each U. S. ICBM silo. Within the 
shaded areas the cumulative biological doses of 
radiation would rise above the 450 rad average 
lethal level— even for people who stayed shel­
tered indoors, where the radiation level is 
assumed to be one third of that outdoors (U. S. 
Sen. For. Rel. Comm., 1975).
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to earth as radioactive fallout downwind from the 
target. Most of the fatalities associated with 
attacks on U.S. ICBM silos were found to be due to 
radiation doses from this fallout.
When Schlesinger first returned to brief the 
Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on counter­
force attacks, he described an attack on U.S. 
ICBM's in which a single one megaton warhead was 
exploded at its "optimum height of burst" over 
each silo and the resulting fallout was carried 
downwind by "typical August winds." The DOD ana­
lysts also assumed that, by the time the fallout 
had reached the cities downwind a few hours later, 
the residents would have all found places in the 
best available below-ground fallout shelters and 
that they would have the discipline and supplies 
to stay there for about two weeks. With these as­
sumptions, the DOD's computers found that an at­
tack on U.S. ICBM's would result in about 800,000 
fatalities (U.S. Sen. For. Rel. Comm., 1974b).
The review committee found some of these as­
sumptions to be optimistic, however, and therefore 
suggested that the DOD recalculate its numbers 
with different, more realistic assumptions. Some 
of the more important suggestions were the follow­
ing (U.S. Sen. For. Rel. Comm., 1975):
• Since a single air-burst would not maximize
the probability of destroying a missile 
silo, a surface-burst should be assumed as 
well. (A surface-burst would, however, in­
crease the intensity of the radioactive 
fallout severalfold.);
• The sensitivity of the results to different
wind conditions should be investigated. 
(As a result, the DOD analysts found that 
the greatest casualties would result with 
"typical March [not August] winds".); and
I Less optimistic assumptions should be made 
about the use of fallout shelters. (The 
DOD therefore made calculations assuming 
that about 45 percent of the population did 
not stay in below-ground shelters.)
As a result of these changes, the DOD's casualty 
estimates increased by an order of magnitude. It 
was now estimated that the U.S. would suffer as 
many as 5 million fatalities from an attack with 
two 550 kiloton warheads exploded over each ICBM
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silo (one at the surface and one at "optimum 
height-of-burst") and as many as 18 million deaths 
if the warhead yields were increased to 3 megatons 
(U.S. Sen. For. Rel. Comm., 1975).
The lower (550 kiloton) yield warheads as­
sumed are near the low end of the range (0.5 to 
1.0 megatons) ordinarily assumed for the yields of 
the multiple warheads on Soviet SS-17, SS-18, and 
SS-19 missiles (Tinajero, 1981). The higher (3 
megaton) yield warheads fall outside of this 
range, but there is another scenario that would 
result in approximately this megatonnage being de­
posited on the ICBM fields. This would involve a 
one megaton surface-burst on each missile silo and 
a 20 megaton surface-burst on the hardened launch 
control facility that is associated with each 
"flight" of ten Minuteman silos. It is believed 
that in the 1960s, U.S. ICBM launch-control fa­
cilities were each targeted with one or two of the 
single very heavy (estimated 10-20 megaton yield) 
warheads carried by SS-9 missiles (Berman and 
Baker, 1982). The SS-18 missile, which has re­
placed the SS-9, has also been flight-tested with 
a single heavy warhead, although most are believed 
to carry 8-10 lighter warheads (Tinajero, 1981).
Fig. 2-5 shows that, given "typical March 
winds," the overlapping fallout patterns from in­
dividual missile silos would result in lethal 
levels of fallout covering hundreds of thousands 
of square kilometers and extending to distances of 
greater than one thousand kilometers downwind from 
the Minuteman fields. Cumulative radiation doses 
inside intact houses in the shaded areas would ex­
ceed 450 rads. The radiation dose-lethality curve 
shown in Fig. 2-6 indicates that a 450 rad dose 
would result in approximately a 50 percent fatali­
ty rate in the exposed population.
Attacks on Nuclear Bomber Bases
A Soviet counterforce attack would also be 
expected to target the 19 U.S. Strategic Air Com­
mand (SAC) bases that are the permanent bases for 
U.S. intercontinental nuclear bombers and the ad­
ditional SAC bases that host the tanker aircraft 
that would refuel these bombers during their mis­
sions or would act as dispersal bases during a 
crisis (Berman and Baker, 1982). Fig. 2-7 shows 
the locations of the 46 SAC bases to which these 
missions were assigned in 1974 (U.S. Sen. For.
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RADIATION DOSE (ERD IN RADS)
The approximate probability of radiation illness and death as 
a function of accumulated whole-body dose (Arkin et al., 1982).Fig. 2-6.
US STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND 
OPERATIONAL BOMBER AND TANKER AIR BASES
(1975)
Fig. 2-7. The locations of U. S. nuclear bomber, tanker, and dispersal 
bases as of 1975 (U. S. Sen. For. Rel. Comm., 1975).
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Rel. Comm., 1975; see, also, Air Force Magazine, 
1982). Some of these SAC bases are located quite 
close to urban areas. The blast and heat from 
nuclear explosions over these air bases would 
therefore result in many more casualties than 
would be the case for the relatively isolated mis­
sile silos. Below, we attempt to reproduce the 
DOD estimates of civilian fatalities from nuclear 
attacks on these air bases and then explore some 
of the uncertainties in the assumptions used in 
making these estimates.
The DOD Fatality Estimates
In his September 1974 testimony, Secretary of 
Defense Schlesinger presented estimates indicating 
that 300,000 fatalities would result if a single 
one megaton warhead were exploded at an "optimum 
height-of-burst" above each of the 46 SAC bases 
shown in Fig. 2-7. The only other information 
given was that "August winds" and "maximum utili­
zation of existing civil defense facilities" had 
been assumed and that "the fatality level is 450 
REM's or 7 psi, etc." (U.S. Sen. For. Rel. Comm., 
1974b).
Although Schlesinger’s statement about "fata­
lity levels" is rather cryptic, a 450 REM whole- 
body radiation dose is the level at which approxi­
mately one half of the population would contract 
fatal radiation sickness. (See Fig. 2-6. Rems 
may be taken equivalent to rads in this case.) It 
is only natural to infer from Schlesinger’s state­
ment, therefore, that the DOD used a similar curve 
for the blast effects of nuclear explosions with 
the 50 percent fatality level being reached at 
approximately 7 pounds per square inch (psi)1 peak 
overpressure.
This is, in fact, a characterisitic of the 
fatality probability versus-overpressure curve 
which can be derived from the curve shown in Fig. 
2-8a (Oughterson and Warren, 1956) giving the 
probability of death as a function of distance 
from ground zero at Hiroshima. (The low "tail" on 
the fatality curve beyond 3 km in Fig. 2-8a pre­
sumably reflects an imperfection in the survey
iBecause of its nearly universal usage in the 
nuclear-weapons-effects literature, we have not 
converted pounds per square inch into metric 
units in the text. One psi = 0.0689 Bars.
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used and has been suppressed in our parameter­
ization of the curve.) Fig. 2-8b shows this fa­
tality curve replotted as a function of peak 
ground-level overpressure. It has been assumed 
that the yield of the Hiroshima bomb was 15 kilo- 
tons (Loewe and Mendelsohn, 1982) and that its 
height-of-burst was 500 meters (Glasstone and 
Dolan, 1977). Note that the 50 percent fatality 
level is indeed reached at approximately 7 psi. 
It is virtually certain that the DOD used a curve 
such as that in Fig. 2-8b to make its estimates of 
the casualties due to the blast and heat effects 
of nuclear explosions.
Fig. 2-9 shows the total cumulative popu­
lation as a function of distance from the 46 SAC 
bases shown in Fig. 2-7 (FEMA, 1983). It will be 
seen that approximately six million people live 
within 10 miles of these bases. Given the re­
lationship in Fig. 8b between the probability of 
death and peak blast overpressure, and given 
curves for this overpressure as a function of 
height-of-burst and distance from ground zero for 
a one megaton explosion (Glasstone and Dolan, 
1977), one can calculate the total number of fa­
talities around the 46 SAC airbuses as a function 
of height-of-burst. The results are shown in 
Fig. 2-10. It will be seen that the DOD's 300,000 
fatalities correspond to a height-of-burst of 
about 5 kilometers.
This height-of-burst is consistent with the 
DOD* s subsequent statement that the assumed at­
tacks on the SAC bases would result in the "de­
struction of any aircraft flying within 2 to 3 nm 
[nautical miles] of any of the 46 targets SAC 
bases" (U.S.-Sen. For. Rel. Comm., 1975). The 
peak overpressure from a one-megaton airburst at 
an altitude of 5 kilometers would be approximately 
3 psi at a distance of about 3 nautical miles (5.5 
km) from ground zero (Glasstone and Dolan, 1977). 
This is approximately the peak overpressure at 
which Quanbeck and Wood (1976) state that "large 
aircraft of transport types are likely to receive 
• . . severe damage."
A 5 kilometer height-of-burst is, however, 
approximately 1.5 times the height-of-burst that 
would maximize the area on the ground subjected to 
a peak overpressure of 3 psi by a one megaton ex­
plosion (Glasstone and Dolan, 1977). It therefore
37
MILES 0 0.6 1.2 1.9 2.5 3.1
OISTANCE FROM HYPOCENTER
PSI
PEAK OVERPRESSURE
38
Fig. 2-8. Fatalities at Hiroshima as a function of: 
a) distance from ground zero, b) peak over­
pressure and c) time-integrated thermal radia­
tion intensity. The original data are shown in 
Fig. 2-8a (Oughterson and Warren, 1956) where 
the small "x" symbols indicate the total mor­
tality rate at different distances from ground 
zero, "x-1" the mortality rate due to burns 
among people in the open directly exposed to 
the fireball, and "x-2" the mortality rate from 
ionizing radiation among people shielded from 
the termal radiation. The dashed curve in 
Fig. 2-8a indicates the total incidence of mor­
tality plus severe injury.
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appears that, as with their initial assumptions 
about the likely characteristics of a Soviet at­
tack on U.S. ICBM silos, the DOD analysts chose a 
height-of-burst for the attack on the SAC bases 
that would limit civilian fatalities in exchange 
for some lessening of the desired military ef­
fect. As Fig. 2-10 shows, if the height-of-burst 
had been lowered to approximately 3 kilometers, 
where the area subjected to overpressure greater 
than 3 psi (and therefore the military effective­
ness of the attack) would be maximized, the esti­
mated number of deaths would have more than 
tripled to about one million. This is not the 
whole story, however. As will be shown below, it 
was inappropriate for the DOD to assume that the 
level of fatalities resulting from one megaton 
airbursts high over U.S. bomber bases would be the 
same function of overpressure as the fatalities 
that resulted from a 15 kiloton airburst over 
Hiroshima.
Heat Effects
In Hiroshima, the heat from the fireball was 
intense enough to give most unsheltered people fa­
tal skin burns out to distances of 2 kilometers 
(Oughterson and Warren, 1956). The amount of heat 
energy deposited on an exposed surface facing the 
explosion at this distance was about 8 cal/cnr and 
the peak blast overpressure was 3.5 psi.
It would take a somewhat greater intensity 
from a one megaton airburst (about 11 cal/cm2) to 
be as damaging because of the longer duration of 
the thermal pulse (Glasstone and Dolan, 1977). If 
the one megaton explosion occurred at an altitude 
of 5 kilometers on a clear day, the thermal radi­
ation intensity would exceed this level out to ap­
proximately 13 km from ground zero. At this dis­
tance, however, the corresponding peak over­
pressure would be only about 1.5 psi— too low 
according to the overpressure model shown in 
Fig. 8b to cause a significant percentage of 
deaths. It appears, therefore, that in this case 
the heat effects of the nuclear explosion must be 
explicitly taken into account.
We have therefore fitted the Hiroshima fa­
tality data with a family of simple models that 
give variable relative weights to the importance 
of blast and heat. (These models still ignore the
40
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Fig. 2-9. Summed cumulative populations as a 
function of distance from the centers of 
19 operational Strategic Air Command (SAC) 
bases and all 46 SAC bomber-related (in­
cluding tanker and dispersal) bases.
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Fig. 2-10. Fatalaties calculated using the curve 
in Fig. 2-8b— given a one megaton explosion 
over each of the 46 SAC bases— as a function 
of the height-of-burst.
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fact that, at distances closer than 1 km to ground 
zero at Hiroshima, people not shielded by thick 
walls were exposed to lethal doses of gamma radi­
ation from the explosion. Most of these people 
would, however, have been killed by blast or burn 
effects in any case. For nuclear explosions of 
higher yields, the lethal range of the “prompt" 
nuclear radiation emitted by the explosion would 
be buried still deeper within the area of lethal 
blast and heat effects.)
At one extreme of our family of fatality 
models is the "DOD model," corresponding to the 
curve in Fig. 8b in which all deaths are assumed 
to be due to overpressure (blast) effects. For 
our calculations, we have parameterized this 
probability of Death due to overpressure as
PDp = exp[-.69 (7.4/p)1'4], 
where p is the peak overpressure in psi.
At the other extreme, we assume that all the 
deaths at Hiroshima were due to heat. We then 
have a parameterization of the curve in Fig. 8c as 
the probability of Death due to Heat
PDH = 1 - exp[-.69*(19*f/H)1,3] ,
where H is the heat intensity in cal/cm2. The 
factor f is equal to unity for a nuclear explosion 
with the yield of the Hiroshima bomb but must be 
increased for greater yields to take into account 
the decrease in burn-effectiveness of the thermal 
radiation of the associated longer thermal pulse 
(Glasstone and Dolan, 1977).
Fig. 2-11 shows the fatality levels predicted 
by the two extreme models for a one megaton war­
head exploded at an altitude of 5 kilometers, as a 
function of distance from ground zero. It will be 
seen that the thermal effect model would predict a 
much higher number of fatalities in this case than 
the overpressure model used by the DOD— even 
though the parameters of both models are fixed to 
predict the same distribution of fatalities for 
the yield and height-of-burst of the Hiroshima 
weapon.
Between the extreme models, we have a spec­
trum of models obtained by taking their weighted
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where w, the weighting factor, can take any value 
in the range between zero (DOD overpressure model) 
and unity (heat model). Given a one megaton air- 
burst at a height of 5 kilometers above each of 
the 46 SAC bases, the corresponding fatality 
predictions range from the DOD's value of 300,000 
to 1.85 million.
It is unclear what value of w might give the 
most “realistic" model. A value of w = .2, corre­
sponding to a fatality prediction of about 
600,000, might seem appropriate if one assumed 
that 20 percent of the population would be exposed 
to direct thermal radiation effects— either out­
doors or near windows indoors. Higher values of w 
would be appropriate if the heat radiated by the 
fireball caused firestorms well beyond the areas 
of serious blast effects. In either case, it 
appears that the failure to explicitly consider 
heat effects in the DOD fatality model was a major 
omission.
Pattern Attacks
In its critique of the original DOD casualty 
calculations, the Office of Technology Assess­
ment's review group questioned the assumption that 
only one nuclear warhead would be used to attack 
each SAC bomber and tanker base. The panel sug­
gested that it was more likely that the areas 
around each of the bases would be "pattern" at­
tacked with a number of warheads in order to try 
to destroy in the air as many as possible of the 
aircraft that had taken off on warning of attack 
(U.S. Sen. For. Rel. Comm., 1975). The DOD re­
sponded by estimating the number of fatalities 
that would result from pattern attacks on the SAC 
bases but buried its results in the consequences 
of a more comprehensive attack. We have therefore 
made our own estimates, using the set of fatality 
models described above.
The only indication given by the DOD of the 
nature of the pattern attack that it had assumed 
is the statement that this attack would cause the 
"destruction on any A/C [aircraft] flying within 8 
nm [nautical miles] of the 46 target SAC bases"
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(U.S. Sen. For. Rel. Comm., 1975). This corre­
sponds to an area of aircraft destruction 7-16 
times as large as that which had been given for a 
single one megaton warhead attack (2-3 nm [3.7-5.6 
km] radius).
We have therefore estimated the number of fa­
talities that would be caused by a pattern attack 
by assuming airbursts of 7-16 one megaton warheads 
distributed over a circle of 8 nm (15 km) in a ra­
dius around each of the 46 SAC bases. We have al­
so simplified our calculation by assuming an aver­
age probability of death throughout this circle 
equal to the average probability of death through­
out this circle equal to the average probability 
of death in a circle under a one megaton airburst 
with a radius of 3.7 km (16 warhead case) or 5.6 
km (7 warhead case). Deaths that would occur out­
side the 15 km radius have been neglected. With 
these assumptions and an assumed height-of-burst 
of 5 km, we estimate 1.0-1.6 million fatalities 
with the DOD's overpressure model (w = 0) and 
5.3-6.4 million fatalities with the pure thermal 
effects model (w = 1).
Ordinarily, in discussions of counterforce 
attacks against the U.S., it is assumed that the 
escape time of the bombers and tankers would be 
minimized by striking their bases with warheads 
launched from submarines located as close as pos­
sible to U.S. shores. In this context, the bar­
rage attacks discussed above would appear implaus­
ible because the number of one megaton warheads 
required (322-736 for 46 SAC bases) is too large 
to be delivered by the small number of Soviet bal­
listic missile submarines ordinarily on patrol 
near the U.S.
Some of the newer Soviet submarine-launched 
missiles, however, appear to have multiple war­
heads of smaller yield. The SS-N-18, for example, 
is believed to be equipped with seven warheads, 
each with an estimated yield of 300 kilotons 
(Tinajero, 1981). At a height-of-burst of about 2 
km, seven 200 kiloton warheads would be able to 
cover as large an area with peak-blast over­
pressures in excess of 3 psi as the seven one 
megaton warheads exploded at 5 kilometers in the 
hypothetical pattern attacks discussed above. In 
such a case, only one SS-N-18 missile would be 
required for a pattern attack against each of the
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SAC bases for a total of 46 missiles in all— about 
as many as could be carried by three of the Soviet 
Union's 13-plus Delta III class submarines (Jane1s 
Fighting Ships, 1982-83).
We have therefore estimated the consequences 
of a pattern attack with an SS-N-18 missile on 
each of the 46 SAC bases and find 1.6 million 
deaths using the overpressure model and 0.4 mil­
lion using the heat model. (The prediction of the 
overpressure model is higher in this case because 
of the lower altitude of burst.) If one of the 
seven warheads were ground-burst for the purpose 
of cratering and radioactively contaminating the 
runway of each base, there would be an additional 
40,000 fatalities from radioactive fallout (assum­
ing "typical March winds").
Our conclusion from the above discussion is 
that the DOD's original estimates of the civilian 
fatalities from a nuclear attack on U.S. bomber 
and tanker bases were too low— but by a factor 
that is quite uncertain.
Attacks on Nuclear Navy Bases
In peacetime, nearly half -of U.S. ballistic 
missile submarines, (and therefore over 2000 U.S. 
strategic warheads) are located in four ports: 
Groton, Connecticut? Charleston, South Carolina; 
King's Bay, Georgia? and Bangor, Washington 
(Cochran et al., 1983). Other potential counter­
force targets would be bases hosting attack sub­
marines, aircraft carriers, and other ships carry­
ing nuclear weapons that could be used to attack 
the Soviet Union or its navy. There are at least 
six such nuclear navy bases in the continental 
U.S. in addition to the four bases hosting ballis­
tic missile submarines: Alameda, Long Beach, and 
San Diego, California; Mayport, Florida; Newport, 
Rhode Island; and Norfolk, Virginia (Cochran et 
al., 1983). (See Fig. 2-12.) Attacks on these 
bases would result in substantial numbers of fa­
talities in nearby urban areas.
In his 1974 briefing, Schlesinger presented 
an estimate of 250,000 fatalities resulting from 
an explosion of a one megaton warhead over four of 
the above ten naval bases (see Table 2-1). The 
assumed height-of-burst was not given.
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U.S. NUCLEAR NAVY BASES
S S B N -B A LLIS TIC  MISSLE SUBMARINE BASE
Fig. 2-12. Locations of the major bases in the continental U.S.
out of which nuclear-armed naval ships operate.
Table 2-1
Estimated Civilian Fatalities from One Megaton 
Ground-bursts on Ten Nuclear Navy Bases 
(in thousands).
DODa This Work
Blast Fallout Total
Ballistic Missile 
Submarine
Bangor, WA 2 34-260 36-260
Charleston, SC 45 38 0- 15 38- 53
Groton, CT — 30 8-195 38-225
King's Bay, GA 0 0 0
Other Nuclear 
Navy Bases
Alameda, CA 55 22-485 77-540
Long Beach, CA 60 75 72-170 145-245
Mayport, FL — 8 0- 8 8- 16
Newport, RI — 8 4-110 12-115
Norfolk, VA 50 73 1-105 74-180
San Diego, CA 90 51 21-435 72-490
245 340 160-1780 500-2120
Table 1, Notes
aU. S. Sen. For. Rei. Comm., 1974b.
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We have estimated the number of civilian fa­
talities—  from the blast and fallout— that would 
result from an attack on each of the ten conti­
nental nuclear navy bases. A fallout program pro­
vided by the Federal Emergency Management Admini­
stration was adapted for this purpose (Schmidt, 
Jr., 1975). A one megaton ground-burst was assum­
ed as well as the most pessimistic distribution of 
fallout protection factors used in the DOD's cal­
culations (U.S. Sen. For. Rel. Comm., 1975). 
Several "typical" winds— March, June, and 
August— were used (Defense Communications Agency, 
1981), resulting in a range of expected fatalities 
due to fallout. Our results are given in Table 
2- 1 .
Total fatalities in the areas surrounding the 
ten naval bases were estimated to be 0.5 - 2.1 
million. The contribution due to fallout varied 
from less than a third to nearly all of the total, 
depending upon the winds. "Typical March winds" 
gave the lowest estimates while "typical August 
winds" yielded the highest. In those cases where 
a DOD estimate was made (Charleston, Long Beach, 
Norfolk, and San Diego), the DOD figure lies near 
the bottom or below the fatality range that we 
calculated.
In a 1980 NATO war game designated "Operation 
Squareleg" it was assumed that U.S. and British 
missile submarine bases in Scotland would be at­
tacked with ground-bursts of not one megaton, but 
5-megaton warheads (Campbell, 1981). Our prelimi­
nary calculations show that the casualties result­
ing from a similar attack on the nuclear navy 
bases in the U.S. would be several times higher 
than in the one megaton case. The total number of 
fatalities due to blast alone would rise from 340 
to 990 thousand.
Attacks on Nuclear Warning, Communications, 
Command, and Defense Facilities
In order to disrupt if not prevent a U.S. 
nuclear response, the highest-priority targets of 
a Soviet attack on the U.S. strategic nuclear sys­
tem would be U.S. early warning systems, the com­
mand centers that would issue the orders for U.S. 
nuclear weapons use, and the communication systems
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that would transmit these orders.2 Presumably, an 
attempt would be made to destroy U.S. strategic 
defensive systems as well. As a result of such 
considerations, Berman and Baker (1982) list, in 
addition to nuclear delivery systems and their 
local launch-control facilities, the following 
"nuclear threat targets" for Soviet interconti­
nental forces:
• 60 National Command Authority Centers;
• 5 airbases for airborne command posts;
• 60 transmitters for communicating with
ballistic missile submarines;
• 132 radars;
• 28 fighter-interceptor sites; and
• 1 ABM test site.
Ball (1981) suggests that a number of ground 
stations linking the strategic "coramand-and- 
control" network to early warning, navigational, 
military communication, and meteorological satel­
lites would also be targeted.
We have not yet estimated the casualties from 
an attack against the U.S. command-and-control 
system. The numbers are likely to be large be­
cause there are hundreds of targets, and many are 
located near highly populated areas. It is al­
ready evident from the above discussion, however, 
that U.S. deaths from a Soviet nuclear attack on 
U.S. strategic nuclear targets alone would probab­
ly number in the tens of millions— comparable to 
total Soviet losses in World War II— but incurred 
in a period of days or weeks instead of years.
Attacks on Cities
In view of the horrendous, albeit unintended 
civilian casualties which would result from 
serious attacks against strategic weapons and 
their control systems, retaliation against the 
cities of the attacking nation would become quite 
credible.
Attacks on Soviet Cities
In 1968, then Secretary of Defense Robert 
McNamara ordered the DOD to try to quantify the
2These systems are sometimes denoted by the acro­
nym C3I denoting Command, Control, Communi­
cations, and Intelligence.
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Fig. 2-13. In 1968, then Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara published esti­
mates of the percentages of the Soviet population and industrial 
capacity that could be destroyed by the U. S. using 100, 200, 400, 
800, 1200, and 1600 "equivalent megatons" of nuclear explosive 
power (McNamara, 1968). The above curves are interpolations of 
these numbers made by Kemp (1974).
amount of destruction that the U.S. could inflict 
on the cities and industry of the Soviet Union as 
a function of the "equivalent megatonnage"3 of 
nuclear warheads used. An interpolation of the 
results (McNamara, 1968) gives the curves shown in 
Fig. 2-13.
No explanation was given in McNamara's report 
about the assumptions used in calculating these 
results. In the case of population, however, a 
reasonable guess can be hazarded on the basis of a 
comparison of the "assured destruction" curve in 
Fig. 2-13, which shows cumulative Soviet 
fatalities as a function of equivalent megatons 
used, with the curve in Fig. 2-14, which shows the 
cumulative Soviet urban population as a function 
of urban land area. One finds from Fig. 2-15 that 
the 25 percent of the total Soviet population (50 
percent of the urban population) that lives in the 
most densely populated urban areas of the Soviet 
Union lives on about 1000 square nautical miles 
(3500 square kilometers). According to Fig. 2-13, 
this many people could be killed by 270 equivalent 
megatons. Dividing the two numbers gives an 
"equivalent area of death" of about 13 square 
kilometers per equivalent megaton.
This equivalent area of death corresponds to 
the area of a circle approximately 2 km in ra­
dius. This is the area that could be subjected to 
an overpressure greater than 30 psi by an airbust 
or about 20 psi for a ground-burst (Glasstone and 
Dolan, 1977).
In Hiroshima, however, the equivalent area of 
death was approximately equal to the area subject­
ed to an overpressure greater than 5 psi (von 
Hippel, 1983). If this criterion had been used in 
the calculations done for McNamara, the megaton­
nages shown along the horizontal axis of Fig. 2-14 
would be lower by a factor of 5 for ground-bursts 
and up to a factor of 12 for air-bursts. Thus, 
the use of an equivalent area of death scaled from 
that at Hiroshima would, for example, lead to a
aThe "equivalent megatonnage" of a nuclear weapon 
scales in the same way as the area that it can 
subject to more than a given peak blast over­
pressures as the two-thirds power of the mega­
tonnage .
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U.S. urban population: 131 million 
S.U. urban population: 126 million
Area (thousand NM1)
Fig. 2-14. Cumulative Soviet and U.S. urban populations as a function of land 
area, according to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
(1978). One thousand square nautical miles (NM2) equals 3,420 
square kilometers.
12000 PRE-EXCHANGE POST-EXCHANGE
SOVIET FIRST STRIKE U.S. FIRST STRIKE
CALCULATED RESULTS OF STRATEGIC COUNTERFORCE EXCHANGES; 1982 FORCES 
(BOTH SIDES ON GENERATED ALERT)
Fig. 2-15. Comparison of the U.S. and Soviet strategic arsenals as of 1982. The 
arsenals are measured here in terms of numbers of warheads (first row) 
and equivalent megatonnage (second row) as they existed (left hand 
side) and after hypothetical counterforce exchanges initiated by the 
USSR (middle) or the U.S. (right hand side). The surviving forces were 
estimated assuming that the exchanges occurred after a period of crisis 
and that both sides therefore had a greater than usual percentage of 
their ballistic missile submarines at sea and bombers on quick-reaction 
alert (Feiveson and von Hippel, 1983).
range of estimates of 20-40 equivalent megatons 
rather than the approximately 200 equivalent mega­
tons that McNamara's DOD calculated would be re­
quired to kill 20-25 percent of the Soviet popu­
lation. (The overlapping of circles of death with 
each other and with the edges of urban population 
areas would reduce the correction factors some­
what, but the addition of fallout effects and 
secondary effects such as illness and starvation 
among the survivors of the direct effects of the 
nuclear explosions would increase them.)
Fig. 2-15 shows that in 1983, even after ab­
sorbing a first strike, both the U.S. and USSR 
would have thousands of equivalent megatons in 
their surviving nuclear arsenals. A comparison 
with Fig. 2-14 shows that, even without taking in­
to account the conservatism in the calculations 
done for McNamara, this explosive power is well 
into the "overkill" region for both the cities and 
industry of the USSR.
More recent studies have confirmed this con­
clusion with more detail. In one analysis, for 
example, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency (U.S. ACDA, 1978) estimated that those 
U.S. strategic bombers and ballistic missile sub­
marines surviving a Soviet first strike could sub­
ject 65 to 90 percent of "key Soviet production 
capacity" (primary metals, petroleum products, 
electric power generation, etc.) to peak over­
pressures in excess of 10 psi. The ACDA estimated 
that the same attack would also destory 60 to 80 
percent of the remaining, non-targeted Soviet pro­
duction capacity by "collateral damage".
The hypothetical U.S. attack in this case was 
directed against Soviet "strategic forces, other 
military targets, and industry"— not population. 
Nevertheless, it was estimated that, if the Soviet 
population remained in place, 80-95 million fatal­
ities would result. It was also estimated that 
this number of fatalities could be reduced to 23- 
34 million if Soviet cities were evacuated. The 
ACDA pointed out, however, that its assumptions 
concerning the effectiveness of evacuation were 
extremely optimistic:
80 percent of the urban population evacuates
the cities to range up to 150 km and the
remaining 20 percent take protection in the
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best available shelters. The evacuated 
people are located with the rural population, 
and both the evacuees and rural people go to 
the best availale rural shelters and build 
hasty shelters . . . This posture represents
an immense civil defense effort and no analy­
sis was made to determine the feasibility of 
implementing such a posture.
The report adds that, if "residual weapons [were 
used] to directly target the evacuated popu­
lation," the number of Soviet fatalities could be 
increased back up to 54-65 million. None of these 
fatality numbers include indirect deaths due to 
exposure, starvation, lack of medical attention, 
epidemics, etc.
Attacks on U.S. Cities
The U.S. Federal Emergency Management Admini­
stration (FEMA, 1979) has designated certain areas 
of the U.S. as "high risk areas" for civil nuclear 
defense planning purposes. According to this re­
port,
Potential target values were developed . . .
based on the following criteria listed in de­
scending priority order:
a. U.S. military installations
b. Military supporting industrial, 
transportation and logistics facilities.
c . Other basic industries and 
facilities which contribute significantly to 
the maintenance of the U.S. economy.
d. Population concentrations of 50,000 
or greater . . .
[Then, after taking into account] projections 
of Soviet capabilities (circa 1980) . . . en­
velopes .were plotted . . .  to depict areas 
subject to a 50 percent or greater probabili­
ty of receiving blast overpressures of 2 psi 
or more.
This hypothetical attack is also discussed 
in a report published by Oak Ridge National Labo­
ratory (Haaland et.,a 1976). (See Fig. 2-16.) 
There, it is described as being associated with a 
specific attack scenario involving a total of 1444 
warheads with the following distribution of 
yields: 20 megatons (241), 3 megaton (176), 2
megatons (184), and 1 megaton (843). This appears 
to be the approximate distribution of yields which 
the Soviet strategic arsenal would have if all
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Hypothetical Nuclear Attack for Cross Relocation Planning.
Circles Show Areas Covered with 2 psi Or Greater over Pressure from Blast. 
Number of Delivered Weapons: 1444. Total Yield Delivered: 6559 Megatons.
Fig. 2-16. CRP-2B Attack Pattern on the Ü.S. The hypothetical Soviet attack used 
by the Federal Emergency Management Administration for civil defense 
planning purposes (Haaland et al., 1976). The areas within the circles 
would be subjected to peak overpressures in excess of 2 pounds per 
square inch.
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2-16 and in the absence of
Soviet ballistic missiles carried single war­
heads. Since the scenario was devised, many of 
these missiles have been replaced with missiles 
carrying multiple independently-targetable war­
heads. In terms of both total and equivalent 
megatonnage (6560 and 3300 respectively), however, 
the attack is still physically possible (see Fig. 
2-15) and does, according to FEMA (1979), cover 
the highest priority U.S. targets.
Fig. 2-17 shows the estimate in the Oak Ridge 
report of the distribution of overpressures to 
which the U.S. population would be subject in the 
absence of urban evacuation. Fig. 2-18 shows the 
corresponding distribution of radiation doses from 
fallout for an unsheltered population with and 
without urban evacuation. It was assumed that 77 
percent of the total megatonnage in the attack 
would be ground-burst on military and industrial 
targets and that the winds would be blowing due 
east at 40 kilometers per hour.
The conversion between the "unit-time refer­
ence doses" shown in Fig. 2-18 and the peak e- 
quivalent residual doses that parameterize the fa­
tality curves in Fig. 2-6 involve factors on the 
order of unity (Glasstone and Dolan, 1977). On 
the basis of Fig. 2-17 (in combination with Fig. 
2-8b) and/or Fig. 2-18 (in combination with Fig. 
2-6) one can therefore conclude that, in the ab­
sence of urban evacuation and effective fallout 
shelters for the evacuated population, about one- 
half of the U.S. population would die in this 
hypothetical attack. This is consistent with the 
estimates by the Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency (U.S. ACDA, 1978) that a comprehensive 
Soviet attack on the U.S. would result in 105-131 
million U.S. fatalities in the absence of evacu­
ation and 69-91 million with urban evacuation. 
Once again, fatalities due to starvation, ex­
posure, and disease were not estimated.
Conclusions
Most discussions of "limited" nuclear war 
focus solely on the political and military costs 
and benefits. Typically, they take little or no 
account of the possible consequences for civilian 
populations of such uses of nuclear weapons. When 
mentioned, these consequences are often dismissed 
without any attempt at quantification as the unin-
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Fig. 2-18. Calculated exposure of the U. S. 
population to radiation in the absence 
of sheltering, given the attack shown 
in Fig. 2-16 and easterly winds— with 
and without evacuation of the cities 
and towns (Haaland et al., 1976).
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tended "collateral effects" of attacks aimed at 
purely military targets.
The above discussion shows, however, that for 
the types of limited nuclear attacks most fre­
quently discussed, the number of unintentional 
civilian fatalities would be so huge as to render 
meaningless any military benefits achieved by the 
attacker.
Furthermore, the infliction of such high 
casualties would surely compound other already 
enormous pressures to move up the nuclear ladder. 
By the time strategic exchanges were occurring, 
there would be little remaining distinction be­
tween the civilian consequences of an attack di­
rected at purely military targets and those of an 
attack deliberately aimed at civilians. It is 
also likely, however, that by this time all cen­
tral control over the targeting of nuclear weapons 
would have been lost in any case [Bracken, 1983].
Clearly the short-term civilian consequences 
of the use of nuclear weapons will be an important 
factor in the determination of subsequent events 
in any future nuclear war. As such, they should 
be taken fully into account along with broader en­
vironmental effects by serious nuclear planners 
and strategists. The result is likely to be a 
more conservative assessment of the utility of 
nuclear weapons and the degree to which we should 
rely on them for our security.
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